The notion of "meaning", however, may be broadened to a semiotic or information-theoretic sense, such that terms have meaning if they can be linked to meanings in some kind of code. The problem here is that there are no codes. Even if the codes were hidden, the property of only an initiated few, the problem would remain entirely: the majority of people would still use symbols without understanding their meanings. Nor could the code merely be unconscious: the criteria advanced by Freud (and others) for delimiting the symbolic code are not coextensive and therefore do not delimit any field of meanings. Symbols do not have meaning in a semiotic sense. Semiotic analyses are themselves a symbolic activity, in which the problem of symbolism is not solved but aggravated.
Similarly, structuralist analyses do not show what symbols mean: though structuralism does make explicit the relationships between symbols, the relationships are not ones of "meaning". Having exhausted all of the standard accounts of symbolic meaning, Sperber concludes that symbols do not mean at all.
Rather than approaching symbolism by analogy to language, Sperber treats symbolism as a form of knowledge. He divides memory into two types: semantic and encyclopedic. Semantic knowledge is knowledge about the extension of categories, such as the range of objects to which the term "bear" might be applied. Encyclopedic knowledge is knowledge about the world: the knowledge that bears eat fish, hibernate, come in various sizes, etc. Sperber argues that symbolic knowledge is encyclopedic knowledge of an unusual representational format. Symbols, rather than having normal encyclopedic entries, are represented instead as propositions in quotes, such as " 'p' is true", where p is a symbolic proposition. For example, the symbolic proposition, "The circle is true", would be cognitively represented in the form, " 'The circle is true' is true". Because of this format, symbolic knowledge, as part of encyclopedic knowledge, is knowledge about knowledge, e.g., the knowledge that "The circle is true" is true. The commentary that accompanies symbols is itself frequently symbolic, so these representations may contain multiple layers of embedded propositions, e.g., " 'p is the word of God' is true", where p is itself a symbolic proposition such as "On the third day Jesus was raised from the dead".
This theory that symbols are represented as propositions in quotes often accompanied by commentary (itself symbolic) receives support from four considerations: (1) it explains how human beings can display both rational and irrational behaviour; (2) it clarifies the relationship between beliefs and figures (figures differ from beliefs in the commentary assigned to them); (3) it shows how symbolic commentary may itself be symbolic; and (4) it distinguishes between symbolic knowledge and other encyclopedic knowledge.
